Granda Depresio: Malsamoj inter versioj

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==Kaŭzoj==
[[File:Money_supply_during_the_great_depression_era.png|thumb|right|300px|Mondispono ege malpliiĝis inter la [[Borsa Katastrofo de 1929|Nigra Mardo]] de la 24a de oktobro, 1929, kaj la bankoferio de marto 1933 pro la leĝo "Emergency Banking Act" reage al la amasa bankopaniko tra tuta Usono.]]
La du klasikaj konkurencaj ekonomikaj teorioj pri la Granda Depresio estas la [[KejnesiaKejnsisma ekonomiko|KejnesiaKejnsisma]] (mendo-regata) kaj la [[Kvanta teorio de mono|monteoria]] klarigo. Estas ankaŭ variaj heterodoksaj teorioj kiuj malgravigas aŭ malakceptas la klarigojn de kaj KejnesiKejnsi-anoj kaj de monteori-anoj. Interkonsento inter la mendo-regataj teorioj estas ke grand-skala perdo de fidindeco kondukis al subita malpliigo de la elspezo en konsumado kaj investaado. Post la ekapero de paniko kaj deflacio, multaj personoj kredis, ke ili povos eviti pliajn perdojn apartiĝante el la merkatoj. Reteno de mono iĝis profitebla dum la prezoj falis pli malalten kaj difinita kvanto de mono aĉetis eĉ pliajn varojn, pliigegante la falon en la mendado. Monteori-anoj kredis, ke la Granda Depresio startis kiel ordinara recesio, sed la drono de la mon-disponado ege pliakrigis la ekonomian situacion, kaŭzante recesion ĝis descendo en la Grandan Depresion.
 
EconomistsEkonomikistoj andkaj economicekonomihistoriistoj historiansestas arepreskaŭ almostĉiam evenlydisigitaj spliten asla todu whetherebloj: theĉu traditionalla monetarytradicia explanationmonteoria thatklarigo monetaryke forcesmondisponaj werefortoj theestis primaryla causeunuaranga ofkaŭzo thede Greatla DepressionGranda isDepresio rightpravas, or theĉu traditionalla Keynesiantradicia explanationKejnsisma thatklarigo ake fallfalo inen autonomousla spendingaŭtonoma elspezado, particularlypartikulare investmenten investado, isestis thela primaryunuaranga explanationklarigo forpor thela onsetekapero ofde thela GreatGranda DepressionDepresio.<ref name="in JSTOR">{{cite journal|at=p. 150|jstor=2123771|url=http://www.employees.csbsju.edu/jolson/ECON315/Whaples2123771.pdf|title=Where is There Consensus Among American Economic Historians? The Results of a Survey on Forty Propositions|journal=The Journal of Economic History|volume=55|issue=1|last1=Whaples|first1=Robert|year=1995|doi=10.1017/S0022050700040602|citeseerx=10.1.1.482.4975}}</ref> TodayNuntempe thela controversypolemiko isestas ofpli lessermalgrava importanceĉar sinceestas thereĉeftendenca issubteno mainstreampor supportla forteorio thede la [[debt deflationdeflacio]] theoryde andŝuldo thekaj [[expectationsla hypothesis]]esper-hipotezo thatkiubuildingkonstruita onsur thela monetarymondispona explanationklarigo ofde [[Milton Friedman]] andkaj [[Anna Schwartz]] — addaldonas nonne-monetarymondisponajn explanationsklarigojn.
 
ThereEstas isinterkonsento ake consensusla that theusona [[FederalFederacia ReserveRezerva System]]Sistemo should(Usono)|Federacia haveRezerva cutSistemo]] shortestus thepovinta processhaltigi ofla monetaryprocezon deflationde andmondeflacio bankingkaj collapsebankofalo. IfSe theyili hadestus donefarinta thistion, thela economicekonomia downturnrezulto wouldestus haveestinta beenmulte farmalpli lessakra severekaj andmulte muchpli shortermallonga.<ref>{{cite journal|at=p. 143|jstor=2123771|url=http://www.employees.csbsju.edu/jolson/ECON315/Whaples2123771.pdf|title=Where is There Consensus Among American Economic Historians? The Results of a Survey on Forty Propositions|journal=The Journal of Economic History|volume=55|issue=1|last1=Whaples|first1=Robert|year=1995|doi=10.1017/S0022050700040602|citeseerx=10.1.1.482.4975}}</ref>
 
===Ĉeftendencaj klarigoj===
 
Modern mainstream economists see the reasons in
* Insufficient demand from the private sector and insufficient fiscal spending ([[Keynesians]]).
* A money supply reduction ([[Monetarists]]) and therefore a banking crisis, reduction of credit and bankruptcies.
 
Insufficient spending, the money supply reduction and debt on margin led to falling prices and further bankruptcies ([[Irving Fisher]]'s debt deflation).
 
====Kejnsisma teorio====
British economist [[John Maynard Keynes]] argued in ''[[The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money]]'' that lower [[aggregate expenditure]]s in the economy contributed to a massive decline in income and to employment that was well below the average. In such a situation, the economy reached equilibrium at low levels of economic activity and high unemployment.
 
Keynes's basic idea was simple: to keep people fully employed, governments have to run deficits when the economy is slowing, as the private sector would not invest enough to keep production at the normal level and bring the economy out of recession. Keynesian economists called on governments during times of [[Crisis (economic)|economic crisis]] to pick up the slack by increasing [[government spending]] or cutting taxes.
 
As the Depression wore on, [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] tried [[public works]], [[Agricultural subsidy|farm subsidies]], and other devices to restart the U.S. economy, but never completely gave up trying to balance the budget. According to the Keynesians, this improved the economy, but Roosevelt never spent enough to bring the economy out of recession until the start of [[World War II]].<ref>{{Cite journal| authorlink=Lawrence Klein|first=Lawrence R.|last=Klein|title=The Keynesian Revolution|year=1947| pages=56–58, 169, 177–79|location=New York|publisher=Macmillan|ref=harv}}; {{Cite book|first=Theodore|last=Rosenof|title=Economics in the Long Run: New Deal Theorists and Their Legacies, 1933–1993|year=1997|location=Chapel Hill|publisher=University of North Carolina Press|isbn=0-8078-2315-5|ref=harv}}</ref>
 
====Mondispona teorio====
[[File:Great Depression monetary policy.png|thumb|The Great Depression in the U.S. from a monetary view. [[Real gross domestic product]] in 1996-Dollar (blue), [[price index]] (red), [[money supply]] M2 (green) and number of banks (grey). All data adjusted to 1929 = 100%.]]
[[File:American union bank.gif|thumb|Crowd at New York's American Union Bank during a [[bank run]] early in the Great Depression]]
 
The monetarist explanation was given by American economists [[Milton Friedman]] and [[Anna J. Schwartz]].<ref>A Monetary History of the United States, 1857-1960. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1963.</ref> They argued that the Great Depression was caused by the banking crisis that caused one-third of all banks to vanish, a reduction of bank shareholder wealth and more importantly [[Contractionary monetary policy|monetary contraction]] of 35%, which they called "The [[Great Contraction]]". This caused a price drop of 33% ([[deflation]]).<ref>Randall E. Parker (2003), [https://books.google.com/books?id=Y-g4AgAAQBAJ&lpg=PR1&pg=PA11#v=snippet&q=%22Pin%20the%20blame%20squarely%20on%20the%20Federal%20Reserve%22 ''Reflections on the Great Depression''], Edward Elgar Publishing, {{ISBN|978-1-84376-550-9}}, pp. 11–12</ref> By not lowering interest rates, by not increasing the monetary base and by not injecting liquidity into the banking system to prevent it from crumbling, the Federal Reserve passively watched the transformation of a normal recession into the Great Depression. Friedman and Schwartz argued that the downward turn in the economy, starting with the stock market crash, would merely have been an ordinary recession if the Federal Reserve had taken aggressive action.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Friedman|first1=Milton|author2=Anna Jacobson Schwartz|title=The Great Contraction, 1929–1933|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=-lCArZfazBkC&q=%22Regarding%20the%20Great%20Depression%20You're%20right%20We%20did%20it%22|year=2008|publisher=Princeton University Press|isbn=978-0691137940|edition=New}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last=Bernanke|first=Ben|year=2000|title=Essays on the Great Depression|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=c2OSWhLjzJkC&lpg=PA7&vq=Schwartz&pg=PA6#v=onepage|publisher=Princeton University Press|page=7|isbn=0-691-01698-4}}</ref> This view was endorsed by [[Federal Reserve Board of Governors|Federal Reserve Governor]] [[Ben Bernanke]] in a speech honoring Friedman and Schwartz with this statement:
 
{{quote|Let me end my talk by abusing slightly my status as an official representative of the Federal Reserve. I would like to say to Milton and Anna: Regarding the Great Depression, you're right. We did it. We're very sorry. But thanks to you, we won't do it again.<ref>Ben S. Bernanke (8 Nov 2002), [http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2002/20021108/default.htm FederalReserve.gov: Remarks by Governor Ben S. Bernanke] Conference to Honor Milton Friedman, University of Chicago</ref><ref name=FriedmanSchwartz>{{cite book|last1=Friedman|first1=Milton|last2=Schwartz|first2=Anna|title=The Great Contraction, 1929–1933|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=-lCArZfazBkC&q=%22Regarding%20the%20Great%20Depression%20You're%20right%20We%20did%20it%22|year=2008|publisher=Princeton University Press|page=247|isbn=978-0691137940|edition=New}}</ref><br /> — Ben S. Bernanke}}
 
The Federal Reserve allowed some large public bank failures – particularly that of the [[New York Bank of United States]] – which produced panic and widespread runs on local banks, and the Federal Reserve sat idly by while banks collapsed. Friedman and Schwartz argued that, if the Fed had provided emergency lending to these key banks, or simply bought [[government bond]]s on the [[open market]] to provide liquidity and increase the quantity of money after the key banks fell, all the rest of the banks would not have fallen after the large ones did, and the money supply would not have fallen as far and as fast as it did.<ref>{{cite journal|accessdate=May 22, 2008 |url=http://www.nybooks.com/articles/19857 |title=Who Was Milton Friedman? |journal=[[The New York Review of Books]] |date= February 15, 2007|last=Krugman|first=Paul|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20080410200144/http://www.nybooks.com/articles/19857 |archivedate=April 10, 2008 }}</ref>
 
With significantly less money to go around, businesses could not get new loans and could not even get their old loans renewed, forcing many to stop investing. This interpretation blames the Federal Reserve for inaction, especially the [[Federal Reserve Bank of New York|New York branch]].<ref>{{cite book|author=G. Edward Griffin|title=The Creature from Jekyll Island: A Second Look at the Federal Reserve|url=https://archive.org/details/TheCreatureFromJekyllIslandByG.EdwardGriffin|year=1998|edition=3d|page=[https://archive.org/details/TheCreatureFromJekyllIslandByG.EdwardGriffin/page/n261 503]|isbn= 978-0-912986-39-5}}</ref>
 
One reason why the Federal Reserve did not act to limit the decline of the money supply was the [[gold standard]]. At that time, the amount of credit the Federal Reserve could issue was limited by the [[Federal Reserve Act]], which required 40% gold backing of Federal Reserve Notes issued. By the late [[1920s]], the Federal Reserve had almost hit the limit of allowable credit that could be backed by the gold in its possession. This credit was in the form of Federal Reserve demand notes.<ref name="text">Frank Freidel (1973), [https://archive.org/details/franklindrooseve04fran ''Franklin D. Roosevelt: Launching the New Deal''], ch. 19, Little, Brown & Co.</ref> A "promise of gold" is not as good as "gold in the hand", particularly when they only had enough gold to cover 40% of the Federal Reserve Notes outstanding. During the bank panics, a portion of those demand notes was redeemed for Federal Reserve gold. Since the Federal Reserve had hit its limit on allowable credit, any reduction in gold in its vaults had to be accompanied by a greater reduction in credit. On April 5, 1933, President Roosevelt signed [[Executive Order 6102]] making the private ownership of [[gold certificate]]s, coins and bullion illegal, reducing the pressure on Federal Reserve gold.<ref name="text"/>
 
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