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La mondispona teorio estis farita de la usonaj ekonomikistoj [[Milton Friedman]] kaj [[Anna J. Schwartz]].<ref>A Monetary History of the United States, 1857-1960. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1963.</ref> Ili argumentis, ke la Granda Depresio estis okazigita de bankokrizo kiu siavice okazigis la fermon de unu triono de ĉiuj bankoj, malpliigon de la banka monhavo kaj ĉefe la mondispona kuntiriĝo de 35%, kion ili nomis "La Granda Kuntiriĝo". Tio okazigis prezfalon de 33% ([[deflacio]]).<ref>Randall E. Parker (2003), [https://books.google.com/books?id=Y-g4AgAAQBAJ&lpg=PR1&pg=PA11#v=snippet&q=%22Pin%20the%20blame%20squarely%20on%20the%20Federal%20Reserve%22 ''Reflections on the Great Depression''], Edward Elgar Publishing, {{ISBN|978-1-84376-550-9}}, pp. 11–12</ref> Pro ne malaltigi la interesproporciojn, pro ne pliigi la mondisponan bazon kaj pro ne injekti kurentan monon en la bankosistemon por eviti ties vrakon, la Federacia Rezervo pasive rigardis la transformon de normala recesio en la Grandan Depresion. Friedman kaj Schwartz argumentis, ke la malsupreniro de la ekonomio, startante per la borsa katastrofo, estus estinta ordinara recesio se la Federacia Rezervo estus farinta pli agreseman agadon.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Friedman|first1=Milton|author2=Anna Jacobson Schwartz|title=The Great Contraction, 1929–1933|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=-lCArZfazBkC&q=%22Regarding%20the%20Great%20Depression%20You're%20right%20We%20did%20it%22|year=2008|publisher=Princeton University Press|isbn=978-0691137940|edition=New}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last=Bernanke|first=Ben|year=2000|title=Essays on the Great Depression|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=c2OSWhLjzJkC&lpg=PA7&vq=Schwartz&pg=PA6#v=onepage|publisher=Princeton University Press|page=7|isbn=0-691-01698-4}}</ref> Tiu konsidero estis apogita de la Guberniestro de la [[Federacia Rezerva Sistemo (Usono)|Federacia Rezerva Sistemo]] nome Ben Bernanke en diskurso komence de la 21a jarcento honorante Friedman kaj Schwartz per tiu aserto:
{{quoteCitaĵo|LetPermesu meal endmi myfini talkmian byparoladon abusingper slightlyiom mytroa statusuzo asde anmia officialstatuso representativekiel ofoficiala thereprezentanto Federalde Reserve.la IFederacia wouldRezervo. likeMi toŝatus saydiri toal Milton andkaj Anna: Regardingpri thela GreatGranda DepressionDepresio, you'revi rightpravas. WeNi didfaris itĝin. We'reNi veryege sorrybedaŭras. ButSed thanksdanke toal youvi, weni won'tne dofaros itĝn againdenove.<ref>Ben S. Bernanke (8 Nov 2002), [http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2002/20021108/default.htm FederalReserve.gov: Remarks by Governor Ben S. Bernanke] Conference to Honor Milton Friedman, University of Chicago</ref><ref name=FriedmanSchwartz>{{cite book|last1=Friedman|first1=Milton|last2=Schwartz|first2=Anna|title=The Great Contraction, 1929–1933|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=-lCArZfazBkC&q=%22Regarding%20the%20Great%20Depression%20You're%20right%20We%20did%20it%22|year=2008|publisher=Princeton University Press|page=247|isbn=978-0691137940|edition=New}}</ref><br /> — Ben S. Bernanke}}
TheLa Federacia Rezervo allowedpermesis somela largemalsukceson publicde bankkelkaj failuresgrandaj –publikaj particularlybankoj that– ofpartikulare thetiu [[Newde Yorkla BankNovjorka ofBanko Unitedde States]]Usono – whichkio producedokazigis panicpanikon andkaj widespreaddisvastigitajn runsfalojn onde locallokaj banksbankoj, andkaj thela FederalFederacia ReserveRezervo satpigris idlydum bybankoj while banks collapsedfalis. Friedman andkaj Schwartz arguedargumentis, thatke, ifse thela FedFederacia hadRezervo providedestus emergencyhaviginta lendingurĝan topruntaron theseal keytiuj banksŝlosilaj bankoj, oraŭ simplysimple boughtestus [[governmentaĉetinta bond]]spruntaĵojn onel thela registaro el la malferma [[open marketmerkato]] topor providehavigi liquiditykurentan andmondisponeblon increasekaj thepliigi quantityla ofkvanton moneyde aftermono thepost keyla banksfalo fell,de allla theŝlosilaj restbankoj, ofla thecetero banksde wouldbankoj notne haveestus fallenfalintaj afterpost thela largegrandaj onesja didfalis, andkaj thela moneymondisponeblo supplyne wouldestus notfalinta havetiom fallenfor askaj fartiom andrapide askiom fastĝi as it didfaris.<ref>{{cite journal|accessdate=May 22, 2008 |url=http://www.nybooks.com/articles/19857 |title=Who Was Milton Friedman? |journal= The New York Review of Books |date= February 15, 2007|last=Krugman|first=Paul|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20080410200144/http://www.nybooks.com/articles/19857 |archivedate=April10a de 10aprilo, 2008 }}</ref>
With significantly less money to go around, businesses could not get new loans and could not even get their old loans renewed, forcing many to stop investing. This interpretation blames the Federal Reserve for inaction, especially the [[FederalNovjorka Reserve Bank of New York|New York branch]]filio.<ref>{{cite book|author=G. Edward Griffin|title=The Creature from Jekyll Island: A Second Look at the Federal Reserve|url=https://archive.org/details/TheCreatureFromJekyllIslandByG.EdwardGriffin|year=1998|edition=3d|page=[https://archive.org/details/TheCreatureFromJekyllIslandByG.EdwardGriffin/page/n261 503]|isbn= 978-0-912986-39-5}}</ref>
One reason why the Federal Reserve did not act to limit the decline of the money supply was the [[gold standardornormigo]]. At that time, the amount of credit the Federal Reserve could issue was limited by the [[Federal Reserve Act]], which required 40% gold backing of Federal Reserve Notes issued. By the late [[1920s1920-aj jaroj]], the Federal Reserve had almost hit the limit of allowable credit that could be backed by the gold in its possession. This credit was in the form of Federal Reserve demand notes.<ref name="text">Frank Freidel (1973), [https://archive.org/details/franklindrooseve04fran ''Franklin D. Roosevelt: Launching the New Deal''], ch. 19, Little, Brown & Co.</ref> A "promise of gold" is not as good as "gold in the hand", particularly when they only had enough gold to cover 40% of the Federal Reserve Notes outstanding. During the bank panics, a portion of those demand notes was redeemed for Federal Reserve gold. Since the Federal Reserve had hit its limit on allowable credit, any reduction in gold in its vaults had to be accompanied by a greater reduction in credit. On April 5, 1933, President Roosevelt signed [[Executive Order 6102]] making the private ownership of [[gold certificate]]s, coins and bullion illegal, reducing the pressure on Federal Reserve gold.<ref name="text"/>
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