Etiko: Malsamoj inter versioj

▲The view is at its core a [[foundationalism]] about moral knowledge: it is the view that some moral truths can be known non-inferentially (i.e., known without one needing to infer them from other truths one believes). Such an epistemological view implies that there are moral beliefs with propositional contents; so it implies [[Cognitivism (ethics)|cognitivism]]. As such, ethical intuitionism is to be contrasted with [[coherentism|coherentist]] approaches to moral epistemology, such as those that depend on [[reflective equilibrium]].<ref name="Shafer-Landau & Cuneo foundationalism">Shafer-Landau & Cuneo (2012), p. 385</ref>

▲Throughout the philosophical literature, the term "ethical intuitionism" is frequently used with significant variation in its sense. This article's focus on foundationalism reflects the core commitments of contemporary self-identified ethical intuitionists.<ref name="Shafer-Landau & Cuneo foundationalism" /><ref name="SEP">Stratton-Lake (2014) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intuitionism-ethics/</ref>

▲Sufficiently broadly defined, ethical intuitionism can be taken to encompass cognitivist forms of [[moral sense theory]].<ref name="Stratton-Lake sentimentalism">Stratton-Lake (2013), p. 337</ref> It is usually furthermore taken as essential to ethical intuitionism that there be [[self-evidence|self-evident]] or ''[[A priori and a posteriori|a priori]]'' moral knowledge; this counts against considering moral sense theory to be a species of intuitionism. (see the [[Ethical intuitionism#Rational intuition versus moral sense|Rational intuition versus moral sense]] section of this article for further discussion).