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[[File:Immanuel Kant (painted portrait).jpg|thumb|upright|[[Immanuel Kant]].|right]]
La teorio de [[Immanuel Kant]] pri etiko estas konsiderita deontologia pro kelkaj diversaj tialoj.<ref name="Orend, Brian 2000">Orend, Brian. 2000. ''War and International Justice: A Kantian Perspective''. West Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press: 19.</ref><ref>Kelly, Eugene. 2006. ''The Basics of Western Philosophy''. Greenwood Press: 160.</ref> Dekomence, Kant argumentas, ke por agadi laŭ morale justa maniero, personoj devas agadi el devigo (''Pflicht'').<ref> Thomas Kingsmill Abbott (trad.), [https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/k/kant/immanuel/k16e/#nr1 Immanuel Kant, ''The Metaphysical Elements of Ethics''], 1889 [Preface and Introduction to [http://www.zeno.org/Philosophie/M/Kant,+Immanuel/Die+Metaphysik+der+Sitten/Zweiter+Teil.+Metaphysische+Anfangsgr%C3%BCnde+der+Tugendlehre ''Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre''], 1797]. La deontologio de Abbott tradukas la koncepton de Kant {{lang|de|Pflichtenlehre}}.</ref> Duapunkte, Kant argumnetas, ke ne estas la konsekvencoj de agoj kio faras ilin bonaj aŭ malbonaj, sed la motivoj de la persono kiu plenumis la agon.
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Kant'sLa argumentargumento thatde toKant actke inpor theagi morallylaŭ rightla waymorale onejusta mustmaniero actoni purelydevas fromagadi dutypure beginsel withdevo ankomencas argumentper thatargumento theke highestla goodplej mustbono bedevas bothesti goodkaj inbona itselfen andsi goodmem withoutkaj qualificationbona senkvalifike.<ref name="transition">Kant, Immanuel. 1785. 'First Section: Transition from the Common Rational Knowledge of Morals to the Philosophical', [[Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals]].</ref> SomethingIo isestas "goodbona inen itselfsi mem" whenkiam itĝi isestas [[intrinsicesence value (ethics)|intrinsically good]]bona, andkaj "goodbona without qualificationsenkvalifike", whenkiam thela additionaldono ofde thatafero thingneniam neverfaras makessituacion aetike situationpli ethically worsemalbona. Kant thentiam arguesargumentas, thatke thosetiuj thingsaferoj thatkiuj areestas usuallykutime thoughtkonsiderataj to be goodbonaj, such askiaj [[intelligenceinteligento]], [[wikt:perseverance|perseverancepersevero]] andkaj [[pleasureplezuro]], fail to bemalsukcesas eitheresti intrinsicallyaŭ goodesence orbonaj goodaŭ withoutbonaj qualificationsenkvalifike. PleasurePlezuro, forpor exampleekzemplo, appearsŝajnas notne toesti bebona goodsenkvalifike, withoutĉar qualification,kiam becausehomoj whenatingas peopleplezuron takerigardante pleasurela insuferon watchingde someone sufferaliulo, thistii seemsŝajnas tofari makela thesituacion situationetije ethicallypli worsemalbona. HeLi concludes thatkonkludas, thereke isestas onlynur oneunu thingafero thatkiu isestas trulyvere goodbona:
{{quote|Nenio en la mondo — eĉ nenio trans la mondo — povas esti konceptita tiel kiel oni povas nomi tion bona senkvalifike escepte la ''bona volo''.<ref name="transition"/>}}
{{quote|Nothing in the world—indeed nothing even beyond the world—can possibly be conceived which could be called good without qualification except a ''good will''.<ref name="transition"/>}}Kant then argues that the consequences of an act of willing cannot be used to determine that the person has a good will; good consequences could arise by accident from an action that was motivated by a desire to cause harm to an innocent person, and bad consequences could arise from an action that was well-motivated. Instead, he claims, a person has a good will when he 'acts out of respect for the moral law'.<ref name="transition" /> People 'act out of respect for the moral law' when they act in some way ''because'' they have a duty to do so. So, the only thing that is truly good in itself is a good will, and a good will is only good when the willer chooses to do something because it is that person's duty, i.e. out of "respect" for the law. He defines respect as "the concept of a worth which thwarts my self-love".<ref>{{cite book|last=Kant|first=Immanuel|title=Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals|url=https://archive.org/details/fundamentalprinc05682gut|year=1785|publisher=Project Gutenberg|page=23|edition=10|editor=Thomas Kingsmill Abbott}}</ref>▼
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▲{{quote|Nothing in the world—indeed nothing even beyond the world—can possibly be conceived which could be called good without qualification except a ''good will''.<ref name="transition"/>}}Kant thentiam argues that the consequences of an act of willing cannot be used to determine that the person has a good will; good consequences could arise by accident from an action that was motivated by a desire to cause harm to an innocent person, and bad consequences could arise from an action that was well-motivated. Instead, he claims, a person has a good will when he 'acts out of respect for the moral law'.<ref name="transition" /> People 'act out of respect for the moral law' when they act in some way ''because'' they have a duty to do so. So, the only thing that is truly good in itself is a good will, and a good will is only good when the willer chooses to do something because it is that person's duty, i.e. out of "respect" for the law. He defines respect as "the concept of a worth which thwarts my self-love".<ref>{{cite book|last=Kant|first=Immanuel|title=Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals|url=https://archive.org/details/fundamentalprinc05682gut|year=1785|publisher=Project Gutenberg|page=23|edition=10|editor=Thomas Kingsmill Abbott}}</ref>
 
Kant's three significant formulations of the [[categorical imperative]] are:
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