La tria batalo de Panipato

La tria batalo de Panipato okazis la 14an de januaro 1761 ĉe Panipato, Barato. Panipato estas ĉirkaŭ 97 km norde de Delhio. La batalo okazis inter la Maratha Imperio kaj la invada afgana armeo de Ahmad Ŝaho Durrani. Ahmad Ŝaho Durrani estis subtenita de tri hindaj aliancanoj - nome la Rohiloj (Naĝib-ud-daulah), afganoj de la regiono Doab, kaj Ŝuĝa-ud-Daula (la Navab de Avadh). La Maratha armeo estis gvidata de Sadaŝivrao Bhau, kiu estis tria en aŭtoritato post la Ĉatrapati (Maratha Reĝo) kaj la Peŝva (Maratha Ĉefministro). La ĉefa Maratha armeo estis postenigita en la Dekkana Altebenaĵo kun la Peŝva.

La batalo ĉefe batalis inter la artilerio kaj kavalerio de la Marathoj kontraŭ la peza kavalerio kaj muntita artilerio (zamburak kaj jezail) de la afganoj kaj Rohiloj gvidataj de Abdali kaj Naĝib-ud-Daulah, ambaŭ etnaj afganoj. La batalo estas konsiderata kiel unu el la plej grandaj kaj plej eventaj bataloj en la 18-a jarcento.[1] Ĝi havas eble la plej grandan nombron da mortigoj en unu tago raportitan en klasika formada batalo inter du armeoj.

Historiistoj disputas pri la specifa loko de la batalo, sed plej multaj konsideras, ke ĝi okazis ie proksime al la nunaj vojoj Kaalaa-Aamb kaj Sanauli-vojo. La batalo daŭris plurajn tagojn kaj partoprenis pli ol 125.000 soldatojn. Protektitaj bataletoj okazis, kun perdoj kaj gajnoj ambaŭflanke. La fortoj gviditaj de Ahmad Ŝah Durrani atingis venkon post detruado de pluraj marataj flankoj. La amplekso de la perdoj de ambaŭ flankoj estas multe pridisputata de historiistoj, sed oni opinias, ke inter 60.000–70.000 estis mortigitaj dum batalado, dum la nombro de vunditoj kaj kaptitoj varias multe. Laŭ la plej bona okulatesta kroniko - la "bakhar" de Kaŝi Raĝ la Divan de Ŝuĝa-ud-Daulah - ĉirkaŭ 40.000 marataj malliberuloj estis eksekuditaj la tagon post la batalo.[2] Grant Duff inkluzivas intervjuon de postvivanto de ĉi tiuj masakroj en sia "Historio de la Maratoj" kaj ĝenerale konfirmas ĉi tiun numeron. Sheĝwalkar, kies monografio Panipat 1761 estas ofte konsiderata kiel la plej bona malĉefa fonto sur la batalkampo, diras ke "ne malpli ol 100.000 marathoj (soldatoj kaj nebatalantoj) pereis dum kaj post la batalo."[3]

FonoRedakti

Malkresko de la Mughal ImperioRedakti

 
Vastiĝo de la Maratha Imperio, 1760

La 27-jaraĝa Mughal-Maratha milito (1680-1707) kaŭzis rapidan teritorian perdon de la Maratha Imperio al la Mughal Imperiestro Aurangzeb. Tamen post lia morto en 1707, ĉi tiu procezo renversiĝis post la Mughal Sinsekva Milito inter la filoj de Aurangzeb. Antaŭ 1712, Marathoj rapide komencis repreni iliajn perditajn terojn. Sub Peŝwa Baĝi Rao, Guĝarato, Malva kaj Raĝputana venis sub Maratha kontrolon. Finfine, en 1737, Baji Rao venkis la Mughalojn sur la periferio de Delhio kaj alportis grandan parton de la antaŭaj Mughal-teritorioj sude de Agra sub Maratha kontrolo. La filo de Baji Rao, Balaji Baji Rao, plue pliigis la teritorion sub Maratha kontrolo invadante Panĝabon en 1758.

Letero de Raghunathrao al Peŝwa, 4 majo 1758.

Lahore, Multan kaj aliaj provincoj ĉe la orienta flanko de Attock estas plejparte sub nia kontrolo, kaj lokojn, kiujn ne estis sub nia kontrolo, ni baldaŭ alportos sub ni. La filo de Ahmad ŝah Durrani, Timur ŝah Durrani, kaj Ĝahan Khan estis postkuritaj de niaj trupoj, kaj iliaj trupoj tute prirabitaj. Ambaŭ nun atingis Peŝawaron kun kelkaj rompitaj trupoj... Do Ahmad Ŝah Durrani revenis al Kandahar kun ĉirkaŭ 12–14 mil rompitaj soldatoj.. Tiel ĉiuj leviĝis kontraŭ Ahmad, kiu perdis kontrolon pri la regiono. Ni decidis etendi nian regulon ĝis Kandahar.

Ĉi tio alportis la Marathojn en rektan konfrontiĝon kun la Durrani-imperio de Ahmad ŝah Abdali (ankaŭ konata kiel Ahmad ŝah Durrani). En 1759 li levis armeon de la triboj Pashtun kaj Baloch kaj faris plurajn gajnojn kontraŭ la pli malgrandaj marataj garnizonoj en Panĝabo. Li tiam interligis kun siaj hindaj aliancanoj - la Rohilla-Afganoj de la Ganĝetika Doabo - formante larĝan koalicion kontraŭ la Marathoj.

Por rebati ĉi tion, Raghunathrao laŭsupoze iris norden por trakti la situacion. Raghunathrao petis grandan monsumon kaj armeon, kiun Sadaŝivrao Bhau, lia kuzo kaj Diwan de Peshwa rifuzis, do li rifuzis iri. Tiam Sadaŝivrao Bhau estis fara cxefkomandanta de la Maratha Armeo, sub kiu la Batalo de Panipat estis luktita.[4]

La Marathoj, sub la komando de Sadaŝivrao Bhau, respondis kunvenigante armeon inter 45.000–60.000, kiu estis akompanata de ĉirkaŭ 200.000 nebatalantoj, el kiuj kelkaj estis pilgromatoj deziris fari pilgrimadojn al hindaj sanktaj lokoj en norda Barato. La Marathaj komencis sian nordan vojaĝon de Patdur la 14an de marto 1760. Ambaŭ flankoj provis alporti la navabon de Awadh, Ŝuĝa-ud-Daulah, en sia flanko. Je malfrua julio Ŝuĝa-ud-Daulah prenis la decidon aliĝi al la afgana-Rohilla-koalicio, preferante aliĝi al kio estis perceptita kiel la "armeo de Islamo". Ĉi tio strategie estis grava perdo por la maratonoj, ĉar Ŝuĝa disponigis multe bezonatajn financojn por la longa restado de Afganio en Norda Barato. Estas dubinde, ĉu la afgana-Rohilla-koalicio havus la rimedojn daŭrigi sian konflikton kun la Marathoj sen la subteno de Ŝuĝa.

Pliiĝo de la MarathojRedakti

Grant Duff priskribis la armeon de Maratha jene:[5]

La altaj kaj ampleksaj tendoj, tegitaj per silkoj kaj fajnaj drapoj, estis surmontitaj de grandaj oraj ornamaĵoj, videblaj malproksime... Granda nombro da elefantoj, flagoj de ĉiuj priskriboj, la plej belaj ĉevaloj, grandioze ornamitaj ... ŝajnis esti kolektita el ĉiuj lokoj...ĝi estis imitaĵo de la pli kaj pli gustuma aro de la Mughaloj en la zenito de ilia gloro.

Intertempe La Marathoj akiris kontrolon de konsiderinda parto de Barato en la periodo (1712-1757). En 1758 ili nominale okupis Delhion, kaptis Lahor kaj forpelis Timur Ŝah Durrani,[6] la filon kaj vicestron de la afgana reganto Ahmad Ŝah Abdali. Ĉi tio estis la zenito de Maratha ekspansio, kie la limoj de ilia imperio etendiĝis de la nordo de la rivero Sindhu ĝis suden en norda Keralo. Tamen, Delhio tamen restis sub la kontrolo de Mughals kaj ŝlosilaj islamaj intelektuloj inkluzive de Ŝah-Waliullah kaj aliaj islamaj klerikoj en Barato timis ĉi tiujn evoluojn. En malespero ili alvokis Ahmad Ŝah Abdali, la reganton de Afganio, por ĉesigi la minacon.[7]

 
Engraving of a Maratha soldier by James Forbes.

PreludoRedakti

Ahmad Ŝah Durrani, ĉagrenita de la novaĵoj de lia filo kaj liaj aliancanoj, ne volis permesi la disvastiĝon de la senkontrolitaj Marathoj. Antaŭ la fino de 1759 Abdali kun liaj afganaj triboj, liaj aliancanoj Baloch, kaj lia aliancano la Rohilla Najib Khan atingis Lahore same kiel Delhio kaj venkis la pli malgrandajn malamikajn garnizonojn. Ahmed Ŝah, tiutempe, retiris sian armeon al Anupŝahr, sur la limo de la lando Rohilla, kie li sukcese konvinkis la Nawab de Oudh Ŝuja-ud-Daula aliĝi al sia alianco kontraŭ la Marathoj. La Marathoj pli frue helpis Safdarjungon (patro de Ŝuja) en venkado de Rohilloj en Farrukhabad.[8]

La Maratonoj sub Sadaŝivrao Bhau respondis la novaĵojn pri la reveno de la afganoj al Norda Barato kaj kreantis armeon, kaj ili marŝis norden. La forto de Bhau estis pliigita de iuj Marathaj fortoj sub Holkar, Scindia, Gaikwad kaj Govind Pant Bundele. Suraj Mal (la Jat-reganto de Bharatpur) ankaŭ aliĝis al Sadaŝiv en la komenco. Ĉi tiu kombinita armeo kaptis la ĉefurbon Mughal, Delhion, el afgana garnizono en decembro 1759.[9] Delhio estis reduktita al cindroj multajn fojojn pro antaŭaj invadoj, kaj krome estis akra malabundeco de provizoj en la Maratha tendaro. Bhau ordonis prirabadon de la jam senhoma urbo.[10] La Jatoj retiriĝis sian subtenon al la Marathoj. Ilia retiro de la sekva batalo influis la rezulton. Abdali komencis atakante malgrandan Maratha armeo gvidatan de Dattaji Ŝinde ĉe Burari Ghat. Dattaji estis mortigita en la batalo.[8]

 
Afghan royal soldiers of the Durrani Empire (also referred to as the Afghan Empire).

Afgana malvenko ĉe KunjpuraRedakti

Ambaŭ flankoj estis pretaj por batalo kaj poste multe da manovrado sekvis. Batalado okazis inter la du armeoj ĉe Karnal kaj Kunjpura. Kunjpura, sur la bordoj de la rivero Yamuna 60 mejlojn norde de Delhio, estis atakita de la Marathoj kaj la tuta afgana garnizono estis mortigita aŭ sklavigita.[11] La Marathaj atingis sufiĉe facilan venkon ĉe Kunjpura kontraŭ armeo de 15.000 afganoj afiŝitaj tie. Iuj el la plej bonaj generaloj de Abdali estis mortigitaj. Ahmad Ŝah estis starigita tendare sur la maldekstra bordo de la rivero Yamuna, kiu estis ŝvelita de pluvoj, kaj estis senpova helpi la garnizonon. The massacre of the Kunjpura garrison, within sight of the Durrani camp, exasperated Abdali to such an extent that he ordered crossing of the river at all costs.[12]

Afghans cross YamunaRedakti

Ahmed Shah and his allies on 17 October 1760, broke up from Shahdara, marching south. Taking a calculated risk, Abdali plunged into the river, followed by his bodyguards and troops. Between 23 and 25 October they were able to cross at Baghpat(a small town about 24 miles up the river), unopposed by the Marathas who were still preoccupied with the sacking of Kunjpura.[13]

After the Marathas failed to prevent Abdali's forces from crossing the Yamuna River, they set up defensive works in the ground near Panipat, thereby blocking his access back to Afghanistan, just as Abdali's forces blocked theirs to the south. However, on the afternoon of 26 October, Ahmad Shah's advance guard reached Sambalka, about halfway between Sonepat and Panipat, where they encountered the vanguard of the Marathas. A fierce skirmish ensued, in which the Afghans lost 1000 men but drove the Marathas back to their main body, which kept retreating slowly for several days. This led to the partial encirclement of the Maratha army. In skirmishes that followed, Govind Pant Bundele, with 10,000 light cavalry who weren't formally trained soldiers, was on a foraging mission with about 500 men. They were surprised by an Afghan force near Meerut, and in the ensuing fight, Bundele was killed. This was followed by the loss of a contingent of 2,000 Maratha soldiers who had left Delhi to deliver money and rations to Panipat. This completed the encirclement, as Ahmad Shah had cut off the Maratha army's supply lines.[14]

With supplies and stores dwindling, tensions started rising in the Maratha camp. Initially the Marathas had moved in almost 150 pieces of modern long-range, French-made artillery. With a range of several kilometres, these guns were some of the best of the time. The Marathas' plan was to lure the Afghan army to confront them while they had close artillery support.[15]

Preliminary movesRedakti

During the next two months of the siege, constant skirmishes and duels took place between units from the two sides. In one of these Najib lost 3,000 of his Rohillas and was nearly killed himself. Facing a potential stalemate, Abdali decided to seek terms, which Bhau was willing to consider. However, Najib Khan delayed any chance of an agreement with an appeal on religious grounds and sowed doubt about whether the Marathas would honour any agreement.[16]

After the Marathas moved from Kunjpura to Panipat, Diler Khan Marwat, with his father Alam Khan Marwat and a force of 2500 Pashtuns, attacked and took control of Kunjpura, where there was a Maratha garrison of 700–800 soldiers. At that time Atai Khan Baluch, son of the Wazir of Abdali, came from Afghanistan with 10,000 cavalry and cut off the supplies to the Marathas.[8] The Marathas at Panipat were surrounded by Abdali in the south, Pashtun Tribes (Yousuf Zai, Afridi, Khattak) in the east, Shuja, Atai Khan and others in the north and other Pashtun tribes (Gandapur, Marwat, Durranis and Kakars) in the west.[8] Unable to continue without supplies or wait for reinforcements any longer, Bhau decided to break the siege. His plan was to pulverise the enemy formations with cannon fire and not to employ his cavalry until the Afghans were thoroughly softened up. With the Afghans broken, he would move camp in a defensive formation towards Delhi, where they were assured supplies.[8]

FormationsRedakti

With the Maratha chiefs pressurizing Sadashivrao Bhau, to go to battle rather than perish by starvation, on 13 January, the Marathas left their camp before dawn and marched south towards the Afghan camp in a desperate attempt to break the siege. The two armies came face-to-face around 8:00 a.m.[8]

The Maratha lines began a little to the north of Kala Amb. They had thus blocked the northward path of Abdali's troops and at the same time were blocked from heading south—in the direction of Delhi, where they could get badly needed supplies—by those same troops. Bhau, with the Peshwa's son and the royal guard (Huzurat), was in the centre. The left wing consisted of the Gardis under Ibrahim Khan. Holkar and Sindhia were on the extreme right.[17]

The Maratha line was formed up some 12 km across, with the artillery in front, protected by infantry, pikemen, musketeers and bowmen. The cavalry was instructed to wait behind the artillery and bayonet-wielding musketeers, ready to be thrown in when control of the battlefield had been fully established. Behind this line was another ring of 30,000 young Maratha soldiers who were not battle-tested, and then the civilians. Many were ordinary men, women and children on their pilgrimage to Hindu holy places and shrines. Behind the civilians was yet another protective infantry line, of young, inexperienced soldiers.[8]

On the other side the Afghans formed a somewhat similar line, a few metres to the south of today's Sanauli Road. Their left was being formed by Najib and their right by two brigades of troops. Their left centre was led by two Viziers, Shuja-ud-daulah with 3,000 soldiers and 50–60 cannons and Ahmad Shah's Vizier Shah Wali with a choice body of 19,000 mailed Afghan horsemen.[18] The right centre consisted of 15,000 Rohillas under Hafiz Rahmat and other chiefs of the Rohilla Pathans. Pasand Khan covered the left wing with 5,000 cavalry, Barkurdar Khan and Amir Beg covered the right with 3,000 Rohilla cavalry. Long-range musketeers were also present during the battle. In this order the army of Ahmed Shah moved forward, leaving him at his preferred post in the centre, which was now in the rear of the line, from where he could watch and direct the battle.[8]

BattleRedakti

Early phasesRedakti

Before dawn on 14 January 1761, the Maratha troops broke their fast with sugared water in the camp and prepared for combat. They emerged from the trenches, pushing the artillery into position on their prearranged lines, some 2 km from the Afghans. Seeing that the battle was on, Ahmad Shah positioned his 60 smooth-bore cannon and opened fire.[8]

The initial attack was led by the Maratha left flank under Ibrahim Khan, who advanced his infantry in formation against the Rohillas and Shah Pasand Khan. The first salvos from the Maratha artillery went over the Afghans' heads and did very little damage. Nevertheless, the first Afghan attack by Najib Khan's Rohillas broken by Maratha bowmen and pikemen, along with a unit of the famed Gardi musketeers stationed close to the artillery positions. The second and subsequent salvos were fired at point-blank range into the Afghan ranks. The resulting carnage sent the Rohillas reeling back to their lines, leaving the battlefield in the hands of Ibrahim for the next three hours, during which the 8,000 Gardi musketeers killed about 12,000 Rohillas.[8]

In the second phase, Bhau himself led the charge against the left-of-center Afghan forces, under the Afghan Vizier Shah Wali Khan. The sheer force of the attack nearly broke the Afghan lines, and the Afghan soldiers started to desert their positions in the confusion. Desperately trying to rally his forces, Shah Wali appealed to Shuja ud Daulah for assistance. However, the Nawab did not break from his position, effectively splitting the Afghan force's center. Despite Bhau's success and the ferocity of the charge, the attack did not attain complete success as many of the half-starved Maratha mounts were exhausted. Also, there were no heavy armoured cavalry units for the Marathas to maintain these openings. In order to turn about the deserting Afghan troopers, Abdali deployed his Nascibchi musketeers to gun down the deserters who finally stopped and returned back to the field.[8]

Final phaseRedakti

The Marathas, under Scindia, attacked Najib. Najib successfully fought a defensive action, however, keeping Scindia's forces at bay. By noon it looked as though Bhau would clinch victory for the Marathas once again. The Afghan left flank still held its own, but the centre was cut in two and the right was almost destroyed. Ahmad Shah had watched the fortunes of the battle from his tent, guarded by the still unbroken forces on his left. He sent his bodyguards to call up his 15,000 reserve troops from his camp and arranged them as a column in front of his cavalry of musketeers (Qizilbash) and 2,000 swivel-mounted shutarnaals or Ushtranaal—cannons—on the backs of camels.[19]Ŝablono:Page needed

The shutarnaals, because of their positioning on camels, could fire an extensive salvo over the heads of their own infantry, at the Maratha cavalry. The Maratha cavalry was unable to withstand the muskets and camel-mounted swivel cannons of the Afghans. They could be fired without the rider having to dismount and were especially effective against fast-moving cavalry. Abdali therefore, sent 500 of his own bodyguards with orders to raise all able-bodied men out of camp and send them to the front. He sent 1,500 more to punish the front-line troops who attempted to flee the battle and kill without mercy any soldier who would not return to the fight. These extra troops, along with 4,000 of his reserve troops, went to support the broken ranks of the Rohillas on the right. The remainder of the reserve, 10,000 strong, were sent to the aid of Shah Wali, still labouring unequally against the Bhau in the centre of the field. These mailed warriors were to charge with the Vizier in close order and at full gallop. Whenever they charged the enemy in front, the chief of the staff and Najib were directed to fall upon either flank.[8]

With their own men in the firing line, the Maratha artillery could not respond to the shathurnals and the cavalry charge. Some 7,000 Maratha cavalry and infantry were killed before the hand-to-hand fighting began at around 14:00 hrs. By 16:00 hrs, the tired Maratha infantry began to succumb to the onslaught of attacks from fresh Afghan reserves, protected by armoured leather jackets.[8]

OutflankedRedakti

Sadashiv Rao Bhau who had not kept any reserves, seeing his forward lines dwindling, civilians behind and upon seeing Vishwasrao disappear in the midst of the fighting, felt he had no choice but to come down from his elephant and lead the battle.[6]

Taking advantage of this, the Afghan soldiers who had been captured by the Marathas earlier during the Siege of Kunjpura revolted. The prisoners unwrapped their green belts and wore them as turbans to impersonate the troops of the Durrani Empire and began attacking from within. This brought confusion and great consternation to the Maratha soldiers, who thought that the enemy had attacked from the rear. Some Maratha troops in the vanguard, seeing that their general had disappeared from his elephant and the chaos ensuing in the rear, panicked and scattered in disarray towards the rear.[8]

Abdali had given a part of his army the task of surrounding and killing the Gardis, who were at the leftmost part of the Maratha army. Bhausaheb had ordered Vitthal Vinchurkar (with 1500 cavalry) and Damaji Gaikwad (with 2500 cavalry) to protect the Gardis. However, after seeing the Gardis having no clearing for directing their cannon fire at the enemy troops, they lost their patience and decided to fight the Rohillas themselves. Thus, they broke their position and went all out on the Rohillas. The Rohilla riflemen started accurately firing at the Maratha cavalry, which was equipped only with swords. This gave the Rohillas the opportunity to encircle the Gardis and outflank the Maratha centre while Shah Wali pressed on attacking the front. Thus the Gardis were left defenseless and started falling one by one.[8]

Vishwasrao had already been killed by a shot to the head. Bhau and the Huzurati royal forces fought till the end, the Maratha leader having three horses shot out from under him. At this stage, the Holkar and Scindia contingents, realising the battle was lost, merged their forces with one contingent breaking from the Maratha right flank and escaped from the opening in the Durrani lines southwards as Jankoji Rao Scindia lead the other contingent to reinforce the thinning lines of Marathas.[6] The Maratha front lines remained largely intact, with some of their artillery units fighting until sunset. Choosing not to launch a night attack, many Maratha troops escaped that night. Bhau's wife Parvatibai, who was assisting in the administration of the Maratha camp, escaped to Pune with her bodyguard, Janu Bhintada along with Nana Fadnavis under the protection of Malhar Rao Holkar's contingent. Some 15,000 soldiers managed to reach Gwalior.[6]

Reasons for the outcomeRedakti

Durrani had both numeric as well as qualitative superiority over Marathas. The combined Afghan army was much larger than that of Marathas. Though the infantry of Marathas was organized along European lines and their army had some of the best French-made guns of the time, their artillery was static and lacked mobility against the fast-moving Afghan forces. The heavy mounted artillery of Afghans proved much better in the battlefield than the light artillery of Marathas.[20]Ŝablono:Page needed None of the other Hindu Kings joined forces to fight Abdali. Allies of Abdali, namely, Najib, Shuja and the Rohillas knew North India very well. He was also diplomatic, striking agreements with Hindu leaders, especially the Jats and Rajputs, and former rivals like the Nawab of Awadh, appealing to him in the name of religion.[8]

Moreover, the senior Maratha chiefs constantly bickered with one another. Each had ambitions of carving out their independent states and had no interest in fighting against a common enemy.[21] Some of them did not support the idea of a pitched battle and wanted to fight using guerrilla tactics instead of charging the enemy head-on.[22] The Marathas were fighting alone at a place which was 1000 miles away from their capital Pune.[23]

Raghunathrao was supposed to go north to reinforce the army. Raghunathrao asked for large amount of wealth and troops, which was denied by Sadashivrao Bhau, his cousin and Diwan of Peshwa, so he declined to go.[4] Sadashivrao Bhau was there upon made commander in chief of the Maratha Army, under whom the Battle of Panipat was fought. Some historians have opined, that Peshwa's decision to appoint Sadashivrao Bhau as the Supreme Commander instead of Malharrao Holkar or Raghunathrao proved to be an unfortunate one, as Sadashivrao was totally ignorant of the political and military situation in North India.[24]

If Holkar had remained in the battlefield, the Maratha defeat would have been delayed but not averted. Ahmad Shah's superiority in pitched battle could have been negated if the Marathas had conducted their traditional ganimi kava, or guerrilla warfare, as advised by Malharrao Holkar, in Punjab and in north India. Abdali was in no position to maintain his field army in India indefinitely.[22]

Massacres after the battleRedakti

The Afghan cavalry and pikemen ran wild through the streets of Panipat, killing tens of thousands of Maratha soldiers and civilians.[3][2] Afghan officers who had lost their kin in battle were permitted to carry out massacres of Marathas the next day also, in Panipat and the surrounding area.[25] They arranged victory mounds of severed heads outside their camps. According to the single best eyewitness chronicle – the bakhar by Shuja-ud-Daula's Diwan Kashi Raj – about 40,000 Maratha prisoners were slaughtered in cold blood the day after the battle.[3][2] According to Hamilton, a reporter of the Bombay Gazette about half a million Marathi people were present there in Panipat town and he gives a figure of 40,000 prisoners as executed by Afghans.[3][2]Women and children were driven off as slaves.[25]

All of the prisoners were transported on bullock carts, camels and elephants in bamboo cages.[25]

Siyar-ut-Mutakhirin says:[25]

The unhappy prisoners were paraded in long lines, given a little parched grain and a drink of water, and beheaded... and the women and children who survived were driven off as slaves – twenty-two thousand, many of them of the highest rank in the land.

AftermathRedakti

 
Mahadaji Shinde restored the Maratha domination on northern India, within a decade after the war.

The bodies of Vishwasrao and Bhau were recovered by the Marathas and were cremated according to their custom.[26] Bhau's wife Parvatibai was saved by Holkar, per the directions of Bhau, and eventually returned to Pune.

Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao, uninformed about the state of his army, was crossing the Narmada with reinforcements when he heard of the defeat. He returned to Pune and never recovered from the shock of the debacle at Panipat.[6] According to Shuresh Sharma, "It was Balaji Bajirao's love of pleasure which was responsible for Panipat. He delayed at Paithan celebrating his second marriage until December 27, when it was too late."[27]

Jankoji Scindia was taken prisoner and executed at the instigation of Najib. Ibrahim Khan Gardi was tortured and executed by enraged Afghan soldiers.[26] The Marathas never fully recovered from the loss at Panipat, but they remained the predominant military power and the largest empire in the Indian subcontinent and managed to retake Delhi 10 years later. However, their claim over all of India ended with the three Anglo-Maratha Wars, almost 50 years after Panipat, in the early 1800s.[28]

The Jats under Suraj Mal benefited significantly from not participating in the Battle of Panipat. They provided considerable assistance to the Maratha soldiers and civilians who escaped the fighting.[29]

Though Abdali won the battle, he also had heavy casualties on his side and sought peace with the Marathas. Abdali sent a letter to Nanasaheb Peshwa (who was moving towards Delhi, albeit at a very slow pace to join Bhau against Abdali) appealing to the Peshwa that he was not the one who attacked Bhau and was just defending himself. Abdali wrote in his letter to Peshwa on 10 February 1761:[30]

There is no reason to have animosity amongst us. Your son Vishwasrao and your brother Sadashivrao died in battle, was unfortunate. Bhau started the battle, so I had to fight back unwillingly. Yet I feel sorry for his death. Please continue your guardianship of Delhi as before, to that I have no opposition. Only let Punjab until Sutlaj remain with us. Reinstate Shah Alam on Delhi's throne as you did before and let there be peace and friendship between us, this is my ardent desire. Grant me that desire.

These circumstances made Abdali leave India at the earliest. Before departing, he ordered the Indian chiefs, through a Royal Firman (order) (including Clive of India), to recognise Shah Alam II as Emperor.[31]

 
Map of India in 1765, before the fall of Nawabs and Princely states nominally allied to the emperor (mainly in Green).

Ahmad Shah also appointed Najib-ud-Daula as ostensible regent to the Mughal Emperor. In addition, Najib and Munir-ud-daulah agreed to pay to Abdali, on behalf of the Mughal king, an annual tribute of four million rupees.[31] This was to be Ahmad Shah's final major expedition to North India, as the losses in the battle left him without the capacity to wage any further war against the Marathas, and as he became increasingly preoccupied with the rise of the Sikhs.[32]Ŝablono:Page needed

Shah Shuja's forces (including Persian advisers) played a decisive role in collecting intelligence against the Maratha forces and was notorious in ambushing the leading in hundreds of casualties.[33]

After the Battle of Panipat the services of the Rohillas were rewarded by grants of Shikohabad to Nawab Faiz-ullah Khan and of Jalesar and Firozabad to Nawab Sadullah Khan. Najib Khan proved to be an effective ruler. However, after his death in 1770, the Rohillas were defeated by the British East India Company.[mankas fonto](Bonvolu krei Kategorio:Artikoloj kun senfontaj asertoj ekde april 2017!) Najib died on 30 October 1770.[34]

The result of the battle was the temporary halting of further Maratha advances in the north and destabilisation of their territories for roughly ten years. This period is marked by the rule of Peshwa Madhavrao, who is credited with the revival of Maratha domination following the defeat at Panipat. In 1771, ten years after Panipat, Mahadji Shinde led a large Maratha army into northern India in an punitive expedition which re-established Maratha domination in that area and punished refractory powers that had either sided with the Afghans, such as the Rohillas, or had shaken off Maratha domination after Panipat.[8] But their success was short lived. Crippled by Madhavrao's untimely death at the age of 28, infighting ensued among Maratha chiefs soon after, and they ultimately met their final blow at the hands of the British in 1818.[35]

LegacyRedakti

Ŝablono:Refimprove Ŝablono:Further The valour displayed by the Marathas was extolled by Ahmad Shah Abdali in his letter to his ally, Madho Singh, the king of Jaipur.[36][37]

The Marathas fought with the greatest valour which was beyond the capacity of other races... These dauntless blood-shedders did not fall short in fighting and doing glorious deeds.... Suddenly the breeze of victory began to blow... and the wretched Deccanis suffered defeat.

The Third Battle of Panipat saw an enormous number of deaths and injuries in a single day of battle. It was the last major battle between South Asian-headed military powers until the creation of Pakistan and India in 1947.

To save their kingdom, the Mughals once again changed sides and welcomed the Afghans to Delhi. The Mughals remained in nominal control over small areas of India but were never a force again. The empire officially ended in 1857 when its last emperor, Bahadur Shah II, was accused of being involved in the Sepoy Mutiny and exiled.

The Marathas' expansion was delayed due to the battle, and the damage done to the Maratha morale from the initial defeat caused infighting to break out within the empire. They recovered their position under the next Peshwa Madhavrao I and were back in control of the north, finally occupying Delhi by 1771.

However, after the death of Madhavrao, due to incessant infighting and external aggression from British imperialist forces, their claims to empire only officially ended in 1818 after three wars with the British East India Company.

Meanwhile, the Sikhs—whose rebellion was the original reason Ahmad invaded—were left largely untouched by the battle. They soon retook Lahore. When Ahmad Shah returned in March 1764 he was forced to break off his siege after only two weeks due to a rebellion in Afghanistan. He returned again in 1767 but was unable to win any decisive battle. With his own troops complaining about not being paid, he eventually lost the region to the Sikh Khalsa Raj, who remained in control until 1849 when it was annexed by British East India Company.

The battle was referred to in Rudyard Kipling's poem "With Scindia to Delhi".

Our hands and scarfs were saffron-dyed for signal of despair,

When we went forth to Paniput to battle with the ~Mlech~,
Ere we came back from Paniput and left a kingdom there.

It is, however, also remembered as a scene of valour on both sides. Ataikhan, the adopted son of the wazir, was said to have been killed during this time when Yashwantrao Pawar climbed atop his elephant and struck him down.[38][39]Santaji Wagh's corpse was found with over 40 mortal wounds.[40]

In popular cultureRedakti

Bangali poet Kaykobad wrote a long poem Mahashmashan based on this battle.

Bengali writer, playwright Munier Choudhury’s play Roktakto Prantor (1959) is based on the Third Battle of Panipat.

The film Panipat, directed by director Ashutosh Gowariker, starring Arjun Kapoor, Sanjay Dutt and Kriti Sanon is based on the Third Battle of Panipat. The film released on 6 December 2019.[41]

See alsoRedakti

ReferencesRedakti

  1. Black, Jeremy. (2002) Warfare In The Eighteenth Century. Cassell. ISBN 978-0304362127.
  2. 2,0 2,1 2,2 2,3 Citaĵa eraro Malvalida etikedo <ref>; neniu teksto estis provizita por ref-oj nomataj tss; $2
  3. 3,0 3,1 3,2 3,3 Citaĵa eraro Malvalida etikedo <ref>; neniu teksto estis provizita por ref-oj nomataj jgd; $2
  4. 4,0 4,1 Raghunathrao
  5. Keene, H. G.. The Fall of the Moghul Empire of Hindustan VI, p. 80–81.
  6. 6,0 6,1 6,2 6,3 6,4 Citaĵa eraro Malvalida etikedo <ref>; neniu teksto estis provizita por ref-oj nomataj KaushikRoy; $2
  7. Agrawal, Ashvini. (1983) “Events leading to the Battle of Panipat”, Studies in Mughal History. Motilal Banarsidass. ISBN 978-8120823266.
  8. 8,00 8,01 8,02 8,03 8,04 8,05 8,06 8,07 8,08 8,09 8,10 8,11 8,12 8,13 8,14 8,15 8,16 Shejwalkar, Trimbak. Panipat 1761. ISBN 9788174346421.
  9. (1922) Mogul Empire. The Development of the British Empire. Houghton Mifflin.
  10. Agrawal, Ashvini (1983). "Events leading to the Battle of Panipat". Studies in Mughal History. Motilal Banarsidass. p. 26. (ISBN 8120823265).
  11. Also see Syed Altaf Ali Brelvi, Life of Hafiz Rahmat Khan, p. 108–09.
  12. Lateef, S M. "History of the Punjab".
  13. Shejwalkar, Trimbak. Panipat 1761. ISBN 9788174346421.
  14. Rawlinson, H.G. (1926) An Account Of The Last Battle of Panipat. Oxford University Press.
  15. Rawlinson, H. G. (1926). An Account Of The Last Battle of Panipat. Oxford University Press..
  16. Keene, H. G. (1887). Part I, Chapter VI: The Fall of the Moghul Empire of Hindustan..
  17. Rawlinson, H. G. (1926). An Account Of The Last Battle of Panipat. Oxford University Press..
  18. Rawlinson, H. G. (1926). An Account Of The Last Battle of Panipat. Oxford University Press..
  19. War Elephants Written by Konstantin Nossov, Illustrated by Peter Dennis Format: Trade Paperback (ISBN 978-1-84603-268-4)
  20. Chandra, Satish. (2004) “Later Mughals”, Medieval India: From Sultanate to the Mughals Part II. Har-Anand. ISBN 978-81-241-1066-9.
  21. James Rapson, Edward. (1937) The Cambridge History of India: The Mughul period, planned by W. Haig 4. Cambridge University Press.
  22. 22,0 22,1 Roy, Kaushik. (2004) India's Historic Battles: From Alexander the Great to Kargil. Orient Blackswan. ISBN 978-8-17824-109-8.
  23. 250 years on, Battle of Panipat revisited. Rediff.com (13 January 2011). Alirita 26 March 2012.
  24. Claude Markovits, A history of modern India, 1480–1950. p. 207.
  25. 25,0 25,1 25,2 25,3 Rawlinson, H. G.. (1937) Cambridge History of India IV. Cambridge University Press.
  26. 26,0 26,1 (1994) “Military Developments in India, 1750–1850”, Journal of Military History 58 (4), p. 599–616. doi:10.2307/2944270. 
  27. Sharma, Suresh K.. (2006) Haryana: Past and Present (angle). Mittal Publications. ISBN 9788183240468.
  28. Sarkar, Jadunath. (1950) Fall of the Mughal Empire. Longmans.
  29. K.R. Qanungo, History of the Jats, Ed Dr Vir Singh, Delhi, 2003, p. 83
  30. G S Sardesai's Marathi Riyasat, volume 2."The reference for this letter as given by Sardesai in Riyasat – Peshwe Daftar letters 2.103, 146; 21.206; 1.202, 207, 210, 213; 29, 42, 54, and 39.161. Satara Daftar – document number 2.301, Shejwalkar's Panipat, page no. 99. Moropanta's account – 1.1, 6, 7".
  31. 31,0 31,1 . Invasions of Ahmad Shah Abdali. afghan-network.net. Arkivita el la originalo je 13 August 2007. Alirita 13 August 2007.
  32. MacLeod, John. (2002) The History of India. Greenwood Press.
  33. Rule of Shah Alam, 1759–1806 The Imperial Gazetteer of India, 1909, v. 2, p. 411.
  34. Rule of Shah Alam, 1759–1806 The Imperial Gazetteer of India, 1909, v. 2, p. 411.
  35. https://www.thehindu.com/features/kids/Peshwa-defeated/article14380314.ece
  36. "The lost Marathas of third battle of Panipat", India Today, 12 January 2012. Kontrolita 5 April 2017.
  37. Sardesai, Govind Sakharam. (1946) New History Of The Marathas Vol 2, p. [htt://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.57070/e/n468 444].
  38. India_Modern_Peshwas04.
  39. Pilgrimage to Panipat.This was a revenge on behalf of the sikhs too as this same was Ataikhan was the killer of Baba Deep Singhji & desecrator of Harmandir Sahib in 1757.
  40. . Walking the streets of Panipat. Indian Oil News. Arkivita el la originalo je 28 April 2008. Alirita 8 April 2008.
  41. [1]

Further readingRedakti

  • H. G. Rawlinson, An Account Of The Last Battle of Panipat and of the Events Leading To It, Hesperides Press (2006) (ISBN 978-1-4067-2625-1)
  • Vishwas Patil, Panipat – a novel based on the 3rd battle of Panipat, Venus (1990)
  • Uday S. Kulkarni, A Non Fiction book – 'Solstice at Panipat – 14 January 1761' Mula-Mutha Publishers, Pune (2011). (ISBN 978-81-921080-0-1) An Authentic Account of the Campaign of Panipat.
  • Third Battle of Panipat by Abhas Verma (ISBN 9788180903397) Bharatiya Kala Prakashana

External linksRedakti

Ŝablono:Sister project links

Ŝablono:Navboxes Ŝablono:Mughal Empire